Page:Glacier Northwest v. Teamsters.pdf/22

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Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)
1

Jackson, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 21–1449


GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC., DBA CALPORTLAND, PETITIONER v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 174
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON
[June 1, 2023]

Justice Jackson, dissenting.

The right to strike is fundamental to American labor law. Congress enshrined that right in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and simultaneously established the National Labor Relations Board to adjudicate disputes that arise between workers and management. That decision reflected Congress’s judgment that an agency with specialized expertise should develop and enforce national labor law in a uniform manner, through case-by-case adjudication. For its part, this Court has scrupulously guarded the Board’s authority for more than half a century. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959). Under Garmon, and as relevant here, a court presented with a tort suit based on strike conduct generally must pause proceedings and permit the Board to determine in the first instance whether the union’s conduct is lawful if the conduct at issue is even “arguably” protected by the NLRA. Id., at 245.

Today, the Court falters. As the majority acknowledges, the Board’s General Counsel has filed a complaint with the Board after a thorough factual investigation, and that complaint alleges that the NLRA protects the strike conduct at the center of this state-court tort suit. The logical implication of a General Counsel complaint under Garmon is that