Jackson, J., dissenting
A
Congress’s passage of the NLRA “marked a fundamental change in the Nation’s labor policies.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180, 190 (1978). Prior to that point, union activity had been viewed as “a species of ‘conspiracy,’ ” prompting substantial conflict between labor and management. Ibid. With the enactment of the NLRA in 1935, “Congress expressly recognized that collective organization of segments of the labor force into bargaining units capable of exercising economic power comparable to that possessed by employers may produce benefits for the entire economy in the form of higher wages, job security, and improved working conditions.” Ibid.
The heart of the NLRA is §7, which safeguards workers’ rights “to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U. S. C. §157. Among the “ ‘concerted activities’ ” that the Act unquestionably protects is “the vital, economic instrumen[t] of the strike.” Garmon, 359 U. S., at 241; see §163.
Section 8 of the NLRA provides a list of “unfair labor practice[s]” that employers and unions are prohibited from engaging in. §158. For example, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of” their §7 rights, including the right to strike. §158(a)(1). And it is an unfair labor practice for a union to “refuse to bargain collectively with an employer.” §158(b)(3). Taken together, §7 and §8 establish certain conduct that Congress has deemed protected (§7) and prohibited (§8).
B
Congress could have stopped there. But “Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced
