Jackson, J., dissenting
C
The history and structure of the NLRA make clear that Congress “entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency”—the Board—“armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience.” Garmon, 359 U. S., at 242. Congress thought the Board’s primary role was “necessary to obtain uniform application of [the NLRA’s] substantive rules and to avoid th[e] diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.” Garner, 346 U. S., at 490. That judgment makes perfect sense. The NLRA’s substantive principles are intrinsically broad and potentially conflicting, leaving much for future articulation through case-by-case adjudication. Drawing the line between activities that constitute a protected strike, on the one hand, and unprotected actions for which employers may validly discipline employees, on the other, is a legally and factually complex task. Moreover, that task implicates important economic policy considerations about the relative bargaining power of labor and management that affect not only the parties to a particular labor dispute but also our broader national economy.
To effect Congress’s intent, this Court has consistently recognized that “courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate [these] issues.” Garmon, 359 U. S., at 244. Rather, “it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the task of applying the Act’s general … language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its terms.” Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 500–501 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Board, “if it is to accomplish the task which Congress set for it, necessarily must have authority … to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions.” Id., at 501. So, while the Board’s decision “is not the last word” on these
