existed from eternity, each of the beings in the succession must have begun in time, but the succession itself is eternal. We have then the succession of beings infinitely earlier than any being in the succession; or, in other words, a series of beings running on ad infinitum, before it reaches any particular beings, which is absurd." This appears plausible; but no one can read it without feeling that there is a fallacy somewhere. To shew that there is no weight in the argument, it is only necessary to state it in its most general terms. But before doing so, let it be remarked, that the present argument is quite distinct from that of design or causation, and that consequently the expression, "finite being," is used merely as a unit of time. The most general statement, then, of the argument is this—" An infinite series of finites involves in it a contradiction." So far from this involving a contradiction, it is the only intelligible definition of infinity that can be given. At any rate, when we attempt to form a conception of infinity either of time or space, we take a finite or unit and multiply it indefinitely. We conceive of eternity, for example, by conceiving of an infinite number of years. Let "years " be substituted in the above form of the argument, and the matter becomes still more palpable—" An infinite series of years involves in it a contradiction." The only answer to this is, that there is no contradiction here, unless there is a contradiction involved in the very idea of
