astronomer must be an atheist. We mean only to advert to the argument here employed to banish a Divine Intelligence from the universe. It amounts to this—that, as we can conceive a better arrangement, there could have been no intelligence in the original adjusting of the arrangement. Let us take the moon for illustration. Laplace fancied he could improve on the solar system by placing the moon differently. He endeavours to shew that if the purpose of the moon was to give light to the earth, this could be accomplished far more effectually if the moon was so situated that it revolved round the earth in the same time that the earth revolved round the sun. In that case, she would be always full, and her light would be enjoyed every night, instead of only occasionally. The conclusion is, that she was not ordained to rule the night, seeing that, by a different arrangement, this could be more effectually accomplished. But with all his skill in celestial mechanics, Laplace would not, by the suggested arrangement, improve matters. If the moon' s orbit were situated where he proposed, her light would be sixteen times less than at present, and, what is more, the arrangement would not be a stable one. The moon would not only be at first a very dim lamp, but it would be in danger of going out altogether.
Sir David Brewster, in maintaining the habitableness of the moon, questions the doctrine that her use is to give light to the earth; and he does this on the
