carrying out its real object—the conquest of Sicily. But even they differed as to the means. Lamachus was for sailing direct to Syracuse, Alcibiades for first making an attempt to win over other Sicilian towns and native Sicels to their side. But when the plan of Alcibiades was finally accepted and the armament moved to Catana—which had been induced almost by accident to admit them—it was met by a trireme sent by the Athenians to recall Alcibiades to stand his trial for impiety. His enemies had succeeded in his absence in stirring up the popular feeling against him, and thus the ablest of the generals was lost to the expedition, and a most dangerous enemy was secured for Athens. For Alcibiades sailing, with others recalled with him, on his own private trireme (which his family had for some time past maintained) eluded his escort at Thurii. Waiting till it had departed for home in despair of finding him, he crossed to the Peloponnese. There he instigated the Spartans to take up the cause of the Syracusans, and especially to effect a diversion by permanently occupying a post in Attica. Meanwhile at Catana nothing was done for some months. When at last the Syracusan forces were tempted towards Catana, and the Athenian commanders taking advantage of this movement made a descent upon Syracuse by sea, though they defeated a Syracusan army, they found it too late in the year to begin a regular siege.
Next spring (B.C. 414), however, active operations were begun. The Athenians landed at Thapsus, surprised the high ground above Syracuse, called
