Page:Greenwich v Latham (2024, FCA).pdf/42

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

elaborate analysis of a 140 character tweet; that an impressionistic approach is much more fitting and appropriate to the medium; but that this impressionistic approach must take account of the whole tweet and the context in which the ordinary reasonable reader would read that tweet. That context includes (a) matters of ordinary general knowledge; and (b) matters that were put before that reader via Twitter.

[43] I agree with that, particularly the observation that it is wrong to engage in elaborate analysis of a tweet; it is likewise unwise to parse a Facebook posting for its theoretically or logically deducible meaning. The imperative is to ascertain how a typical (ie an ordinary reasonable) reader would interpret the message. That search should reflect the circumstance that this is a casual medium; it is in the nature of conversation rather than carefully chosen expression; and that it is pre-eminently one in which the reader reads and passes on.

124 In Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149 at 160–61 [32] Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ said that the exercise of ascertaining the meaning that a publication conveys:

… is one in generosity not parsimony. The question is not what the allegedly defamatory words or images in fact say or depict but what a jury could reasonably think they convey to the ordinary reasonable person … and it is often a matter of first impression. The ordinary reasonable person is not a lawyer who examines the impugned publication over-zealously but someone who views the publication casually and is prone to a degree of loose thinking … He or she may be taken to read between the lines in the light of his general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs … but such a person also draws implications much more freely than a lawyer, especially derogatory implications … and takes into account emphasis given by conspicuous headlines or captions … Hence, … where words have been used which are imprecise, ambiguous or loose, a very wide latitude will be ascribed to the ordinary person to draw imputations adverse to the subject.

(Citations and internal quotations omitted)

Consideration

The first pleaded imputation: in its natural and ordinary meaning, the primary tweet meant and was understood to mean that "Mr Greenwich engages in disgusting sexual activities"

125 It will be recalled that in the primary tweet Mr Latham said, in response to the Metcalfe tweet which reproduced Mr Greenwich's accusation that he (Mr Latham) was, among other things, "disgusting":

Disgusting? How does that compare to sticking your dick up a bloke's arse and covering it with shit?

126 Mr Latham submitted that the first pleaded imputation was not carried to the ordinary reasonable person for the following reasons:

(a) it includes the quote from Mr Greenwich, so the reason for referring to "disgusting" was that it echoed an attack on Mr Latham;

Greenwich v Latham [2024] FCA 1050
38