experienced receiving so many hateful and threatening communications directed to Mr Greenwich, and the tone of the communications post-publication was worse;
- (b) the public reaction to the publication of the matters complained of was so threatening that it necessitated the intervention of NSW Police and the implementation of a procedure to handle suspicious mail;
- (c) it resulted in access to the Electorate Office being closed down from time to time, including for a week from 3 April 2023.
191 The evidence of Mr Graham regarding (a) does bear upon Mr Greenwich's reputation, but factors (b) and (c) do not, however unfortunate they were.
192 Mr Smark made a few other points on the serious harm question, but they are, with great respect, without merit.
193 First, it was submitted that there is no evidence of any witness called that they in fact thought less of Mr Greenwich. But none of the cases suggest that the calling of such evidence is required.
194 Secondly, it was submitted that "there is no a priori reason why those already favourably disposed to Mr Greenwich would change that position by reason of the [p]rimary [t]weet". It is not at all clear to me what "a priori reason" counsel had in mind.
195 Thirdly, it was submitted that "there is positive evidence of sympathy and concern from people who approached Mr Greenwich". That evidence was contained in the agreed facts and is set out at [79] to [86] above. But that is not to the point. As was submitted on behalf of Mr Greenwich, "[t]hat submission amounts to little more than an assertion that the damage to Mr Greenwich could have been worse … but it does not erase the actual evidence of harm apparent from the terms of the comments and messages …"
196 As the epithets in [188] above make plain, the communications that Mr Greenwich received as a result of the primary tweet clearly indicate that he has suffered harm to his reputation because of its publication. That evidence, in combination with the inherent tendency of the imputation that he engages in disgusting sexual activities, the extent of the publication and the inferred "percolation" of it, means I am satisfied that the publication of the primary tweet has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to his reputation. For all those reasons, if I may adopt the turn of phrase used by Warby J in Barron v Vines at [69], it is very easy to infer from the
