ing for their assistance. The Jesuits were ordered to leave the country, and with them also the Abbot of Braunau and the Archbishop of Prague, and signal punishment was to be visited upon any one refusing obedience to the Directors. Moravia also began to raise troops, but only for self-defense. That country offered to act as mediator between the king and the insurgents; but her good-will led to no results, owing to the obstinacy of both parties.
By the unfortunate act of violence against the persons of the regents, the Protestant States unwittingly placed themselves in the false position that the Jesuit-Spanish party wished to have them. They had stepped from the legal foundation upon which their opposition had thus far been based, and by this impolitic step gave their enemies a reasonable pretext for depriving them, if possible, of the jealously-guarded Letter of Majesty. Indeed, the whole course of the following struggle shows the utmost lack of political wisdom, patriotism, and strength of character. In looking over the history of the leaders of this movement, it would seem that all high virtues had been exhausted in the long previous wars, and that now there was utter demoralization of character both among the nobility and the wealthier classes of citizens.
The first mistake made by the States was that of choosing a king whom they knew to be the deadly enemy of their religion. Then they permitted their wrath to get the better of their reason, and committed an act of violence against the regents of their king—an act that could not be overlooked by any ruler without compromising his royal dignity. And again the foolish magnanimity of Count Thurn, in not putting
