( 21 )
ny reported,) the manufacturers did not receive generally a profit equal to the legal rate of interest, which would give a loss of about forty per cent. on their products. It is different with the foreign articles of the same description. On such, at least, the country loses nothing, There the duty passes into the treasury, lost indeed to the Southern planters, out of whose labor directly or indirectly it must for the most part be paid; but transferred through appropriations; and well may its advocates affirm, that they constitute an essential feature of the American system. Let this conduit, through which it is so profusely supplied be intercepted, and we feel confident, that scarcely a state, except those really manufacturing, would tolerate its burden. A total prohibition of importation by destroying the revenue and thereby the means of making appropriations, would in a short period destroy it. Bat the excess of its loss over its gains, leads to the consolatory reflection, that its abolition would relieve us much more than it would embarrass the manufacturing states. We have suffered too much to desire to see others afflicted, even for our relief, when it can possibly be avoided. We should rejoice to see our manufactures flourish on any constitutional principle consistent with justice and the public liberty. It is not against them, but the means by which they have been forced to our ruin, t⟨hat⟩ we object. As far as a moderate system, founded on import for revenue, goes, we are willing to afford prote⟨ction⟩, though we clearly see that even under such a system, the national revenue would be based on our labours, and be paid by our industry. With such constitutional and moderate protection the manufacturer ought to be satisfied. His loss would not be so great as might be supposed. If low duties would be followed by low prices, they would also diminish the cost of manufacturing, and thus the reduction of profit would be less in proportion than the reduction on the prices of the article. Be that, however, as it may, the general government cannot proceed beyond this point of protection, consistently with its powers, and with justice to the whole. If the manufacturing states deem farther protection necessary, it is in their power to afford it to their citizens within their own limits, against foreign competition to any extent, that they may judge expedient. The constitution authorises them to lay an impost duty, with the consent of congress, which doubtless would be given; and if this be not sufficient, they have the additional power of giving a direct bounty for their encouragement, which the ablest writers on the subject concede to be the least burdensome and most efficient mode, if indeed encouragement be in any case expedient. Thus those who are to be benefitted will bear the burden as they ought; and those who believe that it is
