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intended to act honestly, would place his property in joint stock with any number of individuals however respect table, to be disposed of by the unchecked will of the majority, whether acting in a body as stockholders, or through representation by a direction? Who does not see, that sooner or later, a major and a minor interest would spring up, and that the former would in a short time monopolize all the advantages of the concern. And what is government itself but a joint stock company, which comprehends every interest, and which as there can be no higher power to restrain its natural operation, if not checked by its peculiar organization, must follow the same law? The actual condition of man in every country at this and all preceding periods, attests the truth of the remark. No government based on the naked principle, that the majority ought to govern, however true the maxim in its proper sense and under proper restrictions, ever preserved its liberty, even for a single generation. The history of all has been the same, injustice, violence and anarchy, succeeded by the government of one, or a few, under which the people seek refuge, from the more oppressive despotism of the majority. Those governments only, which provide checks, which limit and restrain within proper bounds the power of the majority, have had a prolonged existence, and been distinguished for virtue, power and happiness. Constitutional government, and the government of a majority, are utterly incompatible, it being the sole purpose of a constitution to impose limitations and cheeks upon the majority. An unchecked majority, is a despotism—and government is free, and will be permanent in proportion to the number, complexity and efficiency of the checks, by which its powers are controlled.
The committee entertain no doubt, that the present disordered state of our political system, originated in the diversity of the interests of the several sections of the country. This very diversity the Constitution itself recognizes; and to it owes one of its most distinguished and peculiar features, the division of the sovereign power between the state and general government. Our short experience before the formation of the present government had conclusively shewn, that while there were powers which were in their nature local and peculiar, and which could not be exercised by all, without oppression to some of the parts; so also there were those which in their operation necessarily affected the whole and could not therefore be exercised by any one of the parts, without affecting injuriously the others. To a certain extent we have a community of interest which can only be justly and fairly supervised by concentrating the will and authority of the whole in one general government; while at the same time the states have distinct and separate interests, which can
D
