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sary to any change in its political condition, and has placed this important power in the hands of three fourths of the states; in which the sovereignty of the union under the constitution does now actually reside. Not the least portion of this high sovereign authority, resides in Congress or any of the departments of the general government. They are but the creatures of the constitution, appointed, but to execute its provisions, and therefore, any attempt in all or any of the departments to exercise any power definitely, which in its consequences may alter the nature of the instrument or change the condition of the parties to it, would be an act of the highest political usurpation. It is thus, that our political system, recognizing the opposition of geographical interests in the community, has provided the most efficient check against its dangers. Looking to facts and not mere hypothesis, the constitution has made us a community only to the extent of our common interest, leaving the states distinct and independent, as to their peculiar interests, and has drawn the line of separation with consummate skill. The great question however is, what means are provided by our system for the purpose of enforcing this fundamental provision: If we look to the practical operation of the system, we will find, on the side of the states, not a solitary constitutional means resorted to, in order to protect their reserved rights, against the encroachment of the general government, while the latter has from the beginning, adopted the most efficient, to prevent that of the states on their authority. The 25th section of the Judiciary Act, passed in 1789, provides an appeal from .the States Courts to the Supreme Court of the United States, in all cases in the decision of which the construction of the Constitution, the laws of Congress, or treaties of the United States may be involved; thus giving to that high tribunal the right of final interpretation, and the power in reality of nullifying the Acts of the State Legislatures, whenever in their opinion they may conflict with the power delegated to the general government. A more ample and complete protection against the encroachments of the States by their Legislatures cannot be imagined; and for this purpose, this high power may be considered indispensable and constitutional; but by a strange misconception of the nature of our system, in fact, of the nature of government, it has been regarded, not only as affording protection to the general government against the states, but also to the states against the general government; and as the only means provided by the Constitution of restraining the state and general government within their respective spheres; and consequently of deciding on the extent of the powers of each, even where a state in its highest sovereign capacity, is at issue with the general government on the
