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With us however who know from our own experience and that of other free nations, the truth of both these positions; and also that power can be rendered useful and secure by being properly checked, it is indeed strange that any intelligent citizen should consider limitation in sovereignty, as incompatible with its nature; or should fear danger from any check properly lodged, which may be necessary to secure any distinct and important interest. That there are such interests represented by the states, and that on principle the state alone can protect them has been proved; and it only remains in order to meet the objection to prove, that for this purpose the states may be safely entrusted with the power. If the committee do not greatly mistake, it never has in any country, or under any institutions, been lodged, where it was less liable to abuse. The great number by whom it must be exercised, a majority of the people of one of the states, the solemnity of the mode, the delay, the deliberation, are all calculated to allay excitement, to impress on the people of the state, a deep and solemn tone, highly favorable to calm investigation. Under such circumstances, it would be impossible for a party to preserve a majority in the state, unless the violation of its rights be “palpable, deliberate, and dangerous.” The attitude in which the state would be placed, in relation to a majority of the states; the force of public opinion which would be brought to bear on her, the deep reverence for the general government, the strong influence of that portion of her citizens, who aspire to office or distinction in the Union, and above all the local parties which must ever exist in the states, and which in this case must ever throw the powerful influence of the minority in the state, on the side of the general government; and would stand ready to take advantage of an error in the side of the majority. So powerful are these causes, that nothing but the truth and a deep sense of oppression on the part of the people of the state, will ever authorize the exercise of the power; and, if it should be attempted under other circumstances, those in power would be speedily replaced by others, who would make a merit of closing the controversy, by yielding the point in dispute. But in order to understand more fully, what its operation would be, we must take into the estimate, the effect which a recognition of the power, would have on the administration both of the general and state governments. On the former, it would necessarily produce, in the exercise of doubtful power, the most marked moderation. On the latter a feeling of conscious security would effectually prevent jealousy, animosity and hatred, and thus give scope to the natural attachment to our institutions. But withhold this protective power from the state, and the reverse of all these happy consequences must follow,
