Opinion of the Court
ing that these requirements, too, violate the Tenth Amendment.
We granted certiorari.[1] 595 U. S. ____ (2022).
II
A
We begin with petitioners’ claim that ICWA exceeds Congress’s power under Article I. In a long line of cases, we have characterized Congress’s power to legislate with respect to the Indian tribes as “ ‘plenary and exclusive.’ ” United States v. Lara, 541 U. S. 193, 200 (2004); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U. S. 329, 343 (1998) (“Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs”); Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 470 (1979) (Congress exercises “plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs”); Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S. 373, 391 (1921) (“It is thoroughly established that Congress has plenary authority over the Indians and all their tribal relations”); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Congress possesse[s] a paramount power over the property of the Indians”); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 478 (1899) (“Congress possesses plenary power of legislation in regard to” the Indian tribes). Our cases leave little doubt that Congress’s power in this field is muscular, superseding both tribal and state authority. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 56 (1978) (“Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess”); Dick v. United States, 208 U. S. 340, 353 (1908) (“Congress has power to regulate commerce with
- ↑ Hernandez and the families, the State of Texas, the federal parties, and the Tribes all filed cross-petitions for certiorari. After the cases were consolidated, Hernandez, the families, and Texas proceeded as petitioners before this Court, and the federal parties and the Tribes proceeded as respondents.
