Opinion of the Court
problems of Indians” pursuant to pre-existing treaties. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194, 203 (1975) (emphasis deleted).
We have also noted that principles inherent in the Constitution’s structure empower Congress to act in the field of Indian affairs. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551–552 (1974) (“The plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself”). At the founding, “ ‘Indian affairs were more an aspect of military and foreign policy than a subject of domestic or municipal law.’ ” Lara, 541 U. S., at 201. With this in mind, we have posited that Congress’s legislative authority might rest in part on “the Constitution’s adoption of preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Government, namely, powers that this Court has described as ‘necessary concomitants of nationality.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 315–322 (1936)).
Finally, the “trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people” informs the exercise of legislative power. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 225–226 (1983). As we have explained, the Federal Government has “ ‘charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust’ ” toward Indian tribes. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U. S. 162, 176 (2011); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296 (1942) (“[T]his Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people”). The contours of this “special relationship” are undefined. Mancari, 417 U. S., at 552.
In sum, Congress’s power to legislate with respect to Indians is well established and broad. Consistent with that breadth, we have not doubted Congress’s ability to legislate across a wide range of areas, including criminal law, domestic violence, employment, property, tax, and trade. See, e.g.,
