Opinion of the Court
that argument is a dead end.
Petitioners also assert that ICWA takes the “commerce” out of the Indian Commerce Clause. Their consistent refrain is that “children are not commodities that can be traded.” Brief for Individual Petitioners 16; Brief for Petitioner Texas 23 (“[C]hildren are not commodities”); id., at 18 (“Children are not articles of commerce”). Rhetorically, it is a powerful point—of course children are not commercial products. Legally, though, it is beside the point. As we already explained, our precedent states that Congress’s power under the Indian Commerce Clause encompasses not only trade but also “Indian affairs.” Cotton Petroleum, 490 U. S., at 192. Even the judges who otherwise agreed with petitioners below rejected this narrow view of the Indian Commerce Clause as inconsistent with both our cases and “[l]ongstanding patterns of federal legislation.” 994 F. 3d, at 374–375 (principal opinion of Duncan, J.). Rather than dealing with this precedent, however, petitioners virtually ignore it.
Next, petitioners argue that ICWA cannot be authorized by principles inherent in the Constitution’s structure because those principles “extend, at most, to matters of war and peace.” Brief for Petitioner Texas 28. But that is not what our cases say. We have referred generally to the powers “necessarily inherent in any Federal Government,” and we have offered examples like “creating departments of Indian affairs, appointing Indian commissioners, and … ‘securing and preserving the friendship of the Indian Nations’ ”—none of which are military actions. Lara, 541 U. S., at 201–202. Once again, petitioners make no argument that takes our cases on their own terms.
Finally, petitioners observe that ICWA does not implement a federal treaty. Brief for Petitioner Texas 24–27; Brief for Individual Petitioners 56–58. This does not get them very far either, since Congress did not purport to enact ICWA pursuant to the Treaty Clause power and the
