Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 10.djvu/475

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449
HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
449

RECENT CASES. 449 RECENT CASES. Agency — Status of Architect. — The plaintiff was employed by the defendant to prepare plans for a house. The defendant told him what he wanted, and that the cost should not exceed $2,500. The plaintiff furnished the plans, but the cost was too large. Held, error to instruct that, if the plaintiff accepted the restriction as to cost, he must make the plans accordingly before he could recover any pay. Coombs v. Beede, 36 Atl. Rep. 104 (Me.). The court rest their opinion on the ground that the instruction is misleading, as it does not make allowance for the good faith of the architect and the chance of miscal- culation inherent in making the plans. The facts of the case indicate that the architect was not a contractor, but merely an agent, and as such he was bound only to use his skill in performing his agency according to the instructions given him. The case is in line with the responsibility of a lawyer or a physician. Bills and Notes — Check Payable to Fictitious Payee. — The plaintiff drew a check payable to a non-existing person, his clerk having told him that he was in- debted to such person. The clerk then indorsed it to the defendant, a bona fide pur- chaser for value, using the fictitious name. The defendant received payment from the plaintiff's bank, and the plaintiff seeks to recover the amount. Held, the check was payable to bearer, and the defendant is entitled to keep the proceeds. Clutton v. Attenborough, 13 The Times L. R. 114. The case rests ultimately on the construction of the clause of the Bills of Exchange Act, which declares that " where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person the bill may be treated as payable to bearer." At the same time it seems an unfortunate con- struction to disregard the intention of the drawer of the check as to who shall be the payee. In the principal case the drawer never intended his clerk to get the money, while in the case of Bank of England v. Vagliano, [1891] A. C. 107, which the court regard as conclusive of the present case, it was the clerk who was the drawer of the bill and his employer the acceptor. Clearly in that case the drawer meant the bill to be payable to himself by the fictitious name. The construction adopted is at variance with the generally received doctrine that where X gets goods from the owner, either falsely representing that they are for A, or representing that he himself is A, a bona fide transferee of X gets no title. Cundy v. Lindsay, L. R 3 A. C. 459; Hardman v. Booth, 32 L. J. Exch. 105 ; Hentz v. Miller, 94 N. Y. 64 ; Barker v. Dinsmore, 72 Pa. St. 427. The point in the principal case has been decided in favor of the drawer in New York, under a substantially similar statute. Shipman v. Bank, 126 N. Y. 318. Bills and Notes — Transfer after Maturity — Notice of Equities. — Held, where one, to whom notes payable to bearer have been delivered without indorsement, for safe keeping only, transfers them after maturity as his own, for a valuable consideration, his transferee is charged with notice as against the owner, that the transferrer held the notes merely as depositary, Quiniby v. Stoddard, 35 All. Rep. iio6(N. H.). The decision is in line with the authorities, but it is thought that on principle a different result should have been reached. There is a clear distinction between the transferee after maturity from a holder against whom the parties to the note had some defence, and the transferee after maturity from a trustee. The former is chargeable with notice, because possession after maturity tends directly to show that the holder is unable to collect ; but it does not in any way tend to show that, if the holder did collect, another would be entitled as cestui. This being so, the decision is inconsistent with the rule that the purchaser of trust property, without notice, takes it freed from the trust. Carriers — Express Provision Limiting Liability. — The defendant inserted an express provision in a contract of carriage, that he would not be liable for a sum exceeding an agreed valuation of $100. Held, the provision was valid, although the jury found that the actual value of the goods was $250. Loeser v. Chicago, A/., 6* St. P. Ky. Co., 69 N. VV. Rep. 372 (Wis ). The decision places Wisconsin in line with the great weight of authority. Hart v. y?. i^., 112 U. S. 331 ; Squire v. R. A*., 08 Mass. 239; Bclgerv. Drismore, 51 N. Y. 166; Oppenheimer v. U. S. Ex Co., 69 111. 62; Elkins v. Transportation Co., 81 Pa. St. 315; R. R. V. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606 ; Harvey v. R. R., 74 Mo. S38. But see, co.'.tra, Ex. Co. v. Moore, 39 Miss. 822; C/. S. Ex. Co. v. Bachnian, 28 Ohio St. 144 ; R. R. v. Simpson, 30 Kan. 645; Moulton v. R. R., 31 Minn. 85. The reason also for the rule in the prin- cipal case is sound. A carrier may charge more for carrying a costly article than one