322 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. would seem to extend so far as to include those who have rendered other great and meritorious services, and thus are entitled to public gratitude, — such, for example, as societies of disabled or past firemen or policemen. If once the. principle is adopted that a city or town may be authorized to raise motley by taxation for conferring benefits on vidividuals merely because in the past they have rendered important and valuable services for the benefit of the general public, occasions will not be wanting which will appeal strongly to the popular sense of gratitude, or to the popular emotion ; and the interests and just rights of minorities will be in danger of being disregarded. If the body of persons to be benefited is numerous, the greater is the influence that may probably be brought to bear to secure such an appropriation of the public money." So, too, in 1885, there was a question whether the State could au- thorize a town to pay a bounty to soldiers of the Civil War who had enlisted without any promise on the part of the town at the time of enlistment to pay them bounties, and when the town could not then legally pay bounties. The Court held that it could not, say- ing, in Mead v. Acton : — ^ " The bounty to be paid cannot be regarded in the light of compensa- tion for services rendered ; for their services as soldiers were not ren- dered to the town, and the town had nothing to do with their compens^ion. The war has been over for many years, and the payment of these boun- ties cannot encourage enlistments, or in any way affect the public service or promote the public welfare. The direct primary object is to benefit indi- viduals, and not the public. In any view ive can take of the statute, the payments it contemplates are mere gratuities or gifts to individuals. The principle would be the same if a town should vote a gratuity or a pension to one who had rendered services as an officer or was in any way entitled to its grati- tude. This a town has not the power to do, even with the sanction of the Legislature. A statute conferring such power is unconstitutional, because it authorizes raising money by taxation for the exclusive benefit of par- ticular individuals, and appropriates money for a private purpose which can only be raised and used for public objects." So, in case of all the resolves above described, the payments " cannot be regarded in the light of compensation for services ren- dered." Those services in the case of past officials had already been paid for. In case of newly-elected officials who did not serve there could be no possibility of " services rendered." The same is true of payments of unearned salary for the time that officials were sick or incapacitated. 1 139 Mass. 341.
