TIVO THEORIES OF CONSIDERATION. 525 Lord Ellenborough, false gloss though it be, has been generally followed by the courts, and is responsible for the greater part of the objectionable applications of the doctrine of consideration, whereby the reasonable expectations of business men have been disappointed. But notwithstanding its general acceptance, this doctrine of Lord Ellenborough has met with almost unparalleled animadver- sion at the hands of the judges who have applied it.^ The law has been changed by statute in India,^ and in at least ten of our States.^ In one State, Mississippi, the rule was abolished by the Court without the' aid of a statute.* There are also limita- tions to the rule, which emphasize its artificiality. It is common 1 -A creditor " might take a horse or a canary or a tomtit, if he chose, and that was accord and satisfaction ; but by a most extraordinary peculiarity of the English Com- mon Law, he could not take ig.c dd. in the pound; that was nudum pactum. , . . That was one of the mysteries of the English Common Law." Per Jessel, M. R., in Coul- dery v. Bartrum, 19 Ch. D. 394, 399. "This rule, which obviously may be urged in violation of good faith, is not to be extended beyond its precise import." Per Dewey, J., in Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 283,285. "The rule is technical and not very well supported by reason." Per Nelson, J., in 14 Wend. 116, 119. "The rule is evidently distasteful to the courts, and they have always been anxious to escape it by nice dis- tinctions." Per Curiam in Smith v. Ballou, i R. I. 496. "A doctrine utterly absurd, and standing, as it confessedly does, in humiliating contrast to the common sense of mankind." Per Munro, J., 11 Rich. 135, 139. "Several courts seem to have given assent to the rule with reluctance, and condemned the reasoning which supports it." Beck, C. J., in Works v. Hershey, 35 Iowa, 340, 342. " This rule being highly technical in its character, seemingly unjust, and often oppressive in its operation." Per Hinton, J., in Symme v. Goodrich, 80 Va. 303, 304. " The history of judicial decisions has shewn a constant effort to escape from its adsurdity and injustice. ... A moment's attention to the cases taken out of the rule will show that there is nothing of principle left in the rule itself." Per Ranney, J., in Harper v. Graham, 20 Ohio, 105, 115-118. " The courts, while so ruling, have rarely failed, upon any recurrence of the question, to criticise and condemn its reasonableness, justice, fairness, or honesty." Per Potter, J., in Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, 167. Many similar criticisms might be added. 2 Indian Contract Act, Sec. 63.
- Ala. Code, Sec. 2774; Cal. Civ. Code, Sec. 1524; Dak. Comp. Laws, Sec. 3486;
Ga. Code, Sec. 3735; Maine Rev. St., c.82, Sec. 45; No. Car. Code, Sec. 574; N. Dak. Rev. Code, Sec. 3827; Ilill, Ann. Laws of Oregon, Sec. 755; Tenn. Code, (1884) §4530; Va. Code, (1897) §2858.
- Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499. See also to the same effect Smith v. Wyatt,
2 Cincin. Sup. Ct. 12. By decision, too, in some States, a parol debt may be satisfied if the creditor gives a receipt in full for a partial payment. Green v. Laiigdon, 28 Mich. 221 ; Lamprey v. Lamprey, 29 Minn. 151 (semble) ; Gray v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 68 ; Ferry V. Stephens, 66 N. Y. 321 ; Carpenter v. Soule, 88 N. Y. 251 ; McKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N. Y. 260. In others, partial payment is a satisfaction if the debtor is insolvent. Westcott V. Waller, 47 Ala. 492, 498 (semble) ; Shelton v. Jackson, (Tex Civ. Appeals, 1899) 49 S. W. Rep. 414, or even if he is honestly believed to be insolvent. Rice v. Lon- don Co., (Minnesota, 1897) 72 N. W. Rep. 826.
