Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 2.djvu/322

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304

HAR VARD LA W RE VIE W.

the extent of the power of the State to exclude a foreigner from its territory is limited by the right of self-defence." ^ The statute in question exceeded that limit, and was unconstitutional. Upon the same facts, the same rule was laid down by the Supreme Court in Chy Lung v. Freeman,^ speaking through Mr. Justice Miller : " We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right of a State, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted criminals from abroad ; nor to lay down the definite limit of such right, if it exists. Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be claimed beyond the scope of that necessity." The development of this line of deci- sions was cut short by Henderson v. Mayor of New York,^ a case arising from a similar law of New York, applying, however, to all passengers without discrimination. The court hdd that the object of foreign immigration admitted of a national uniform rule, and its regulation by the States for any purpose whatsoever was in conflict with the power to regulate commerce granted to Con- gress.* The question whether or how far the States can exclude actual paupers or convicts was left open.

The most important case on this question, and one which may fairly be said to lay down the principle that a State police law can- not constitutionally interfere with foreign or interstate commerce to a greater extent than the strict necessity of the case requires, is Railroad Co. v. Husen,^ overruling the Supreme Court of Mis souri. An act of the Missouri Legislature provided that no Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle should be conveyed into the State during a period comprising eight months in each year. Transportation of such cattle by railroads or steamboats through the State without unloading was expected, but the carriers were made liable for all damage from Texas cattle-fever communicated along the route. An action was brought against a railroad company under the latter provision. A similar action under an Illinois statute, forbidding entirely the importation or keeping of Texas cattle, had been held constitutional by the Supreme Court of Illinois,^ upon the grounds that the act was a police regulation, and therefore it was unneces- sary to decide whether or not it was a regulation of commerce ;

1 3 Sawyer, 152. * 92 U. S. 275, 280 (1875). * 9* U. S. 259 (1875),

^ People V, Compagnie G^q. Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59 (1882), accord,

  • 95 U. S. 465 (1877). • Yeazel v. Alexander, 58 IIL 254 (1871).