Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/367

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331
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
331

PROBLEMS IN PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION 331 Act ®^ furnishes a reasonable solution. Three classes of debts are there defined, i. Claims payable within the period of limitation. 2. Claims which with reasonable certainty will accrue thereafter. 3. Claims which may never become payable. A creditor whose right of action does not accrue within one year after giving the administration bond may present his claim at any time before final settlement, and, if the court find that the claim is or may become justly due, it shall order the representative to retain sufficient assets to satisfy it. The court has an option to take a suitable bond from those interested and pay over to them the assets. If such a claim is not so presented, all right to sue on it is lost both against the ex- ecutor or administrator and legatees or distributees. Such a lia- bility is a promissory note payable at a future date,^°° or a liability, which, though contingent, presents a fair chance of actual matur- ity.^°^ On the other hand, the chance of holding the estate on the deceased's obligation as surety on a probate bond is so remote that it does not represent a claim which "is or may become justly due." It does not, therefore, require to be filed in court in order to save the rights of the creditor against the beneficiaries of the estate.^°^ But of course there can be no claim against the executor person- ally if his final account has been allowed by the probate judge. This legislation protects the careful executor or administrator, and preserves the rights of the creditor so far as is consistent with not withholding too long the enjoyment of the property from those, who, after creditors, are entitled to it. The practice in Massa- chusetts has been followed more or less closely in some states.^"^ In other jurisdictions every claim no matter how contingent must be presented within proper time or it is barred forever."^ In Illinois

  • Rev. Laws (1902), c. 141, §§ 9, 13, 26-32, as amended by Acts (1914), c. 699.

'"" Bassett v. Drew, 176 Mass. 141, 57 N. E. 384 (1900). "1 Electric Welding Co. v. Fitz, 215 Mass. 315, 102 N. E. 354 (1913). '02 Forbes v. Harrington, 171 Mass. 386, 50 N. E. 641 (1898). i"» Maine, Rev. Stats. (1903), c. 89, §§ 14-18; Greene v. Dyer, 32 Me. 460 (1851); Sampson v. Sampson, 63 Me. 328 (1874); Pole v. Simmons, 49 Md. 14 (1878); Michi- gan, CoMP. Laws (1915), c. 234, §§ 20, 23, 25, 28; Berryhill v. Peabody, 72 Minn. 232, 75 N. W. 220 (1898); Lake Phalen Co. v. Lindeke, 66 Minn. 209, 68 N. W. 974 (1896); Hunt V. Bums, 90 Minn. 172, 95 N. W. mo (1903); Nebraska, Rev. Stats. (1913). §§ 1409, 1412, 1413; Libby v. Hutchinson, 72 N. H. 190, 55 Atl. 547 (1903); Omo, Annot. Gen. Code (191 2), §§ 10748, 10877-883; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws (1909), c. 318, §§ 19-25; Vermont, Pub. Stats. (1906), c. 137, §§ 2912-20; Wisconsin, Stats. (1915), §§ 3858-61, 3866-67; Schmidt v. Grinzow, 156 N. W. (Wis.) 143. ^^ Alaska, Codes (1907), § 821; Arkansas, Dig. of Stats. (1916), c. i, § no;