Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/926

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890
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
890

890 HARVARD LAW REVIEW by publication upon the defendant, a nonresident owner. This service was in accordance with the statutes of Arkansas, which re- quired personal service upon resident owners at least twenty days before the rendition of the decree of sale, but which provided for constructive service by publication of four weeks upon nonresident owners. It was contended that the statute discriminated against nonresident owners, in violation of the provisions of the federal Constitution. As to this Mr. Justice McKenna said: ^° "We have no doubt of the power of the State to so discriminate, nor do we think extended discussion is necessary. Personal service upon non-residents is not always within the State's power. Its process is limited by its boundaries. Constructive service is at times a necessary resource." ^^ Again, the Kentucky statute makes no distinction between causes of action arising within the state and causes of action aris- ing elsewhere. To the extent to which the Kentucky statute at- tempts to allow an action for a cause of action not arising within the state, by service of process upon an agent, it is undoubtedly unreasonable and unconstitutional. But it would seem that there is no objection to holding that the statute is severable and that it is valid as to causes of action arising within the state, out of the business carried on within the state. The statutes relating to cor- porations frequently make no distinction between causes of action arising within the state and those arising elsewhere, and although under Old Wayne Life Association v. McDonough and Simon v. Southern Railway, these statutes have been held invalid as to causes of action arising outside the state, they are upheld as to causes of action arising within the state. There is, however, a ground upon which Flexner v. Parson may ^» 204 U. S. 254. ^ See Kane v. New Jersey, stated supra, p. 886. Similarly it is not uncommon to allow attachment of the property of nonresidents only. This is not an imconstitutional discrimination. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. (Md.) 535 (1797). It is not unconstitutional to allow the attachment of prop- erty of a nonresident without requiring the plaintiff to give a bond, although such a bond is required in the case of attachment of property of a resident. Central Loan & Trust Co. V. Campbell, 173 U. S. 84, 97 (1899); Marsh v. Steele, 9 Neb. 96 (1879). Compare St. Mary's Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia, 203 U. S. 183 (1906), in which it was held that a provision for service upon the state auditor in actions against non- resident domestic corporations and foreign corporations was not imconstitutional, although there was no similar provision as to domestic corporations.