Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/59

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HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
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RECENT CASES, 43 to build houses. The contract provided that the defendants, a firm of iron-founders (selected by the land-owner's architect), should lay a fire-proof roofing on the house, for which the builders were to pay £21t^, and were also to provide scaffolding and other assistance. The defendants employed their own workmen. In the course of the work the plaintiff, one of the builders' workmen, was injured by the negligence of one of the defendants' workmen. Held, by Cotton and Lopes, L. JJ. (Fry, L. J., dissenting), that the defendants were sub-contractors under the builders ; that they and their workmen must be taken to have been in the employment of the builders; that the man who caused the injury and the plaintiff were consequently under a common master and engaged in a common employment, so the action could not be maintained. Fry, L. J., in his dissenting opinion thought that the defendants were indepen- dent contractors ; but that whether they were or not, their workmen were not in the service of the builders; that the man who caused the injury and the plaintiff were not under a common master, although engaged in a common employment. Johnson v. Lindsay, 23 Q. B. D. 508 (Eng.). Partnership — Statute of Frauds — Interest in Land. — The contract of a partner to withdraw from the firm and assign his interest to the other partners is an agreement to assign an interest in land, and must be evidenced by a suf- ficient memorandum within the Statute of Frauds. Gray v. Smith, 43 Ch. Div. 208 (Eng.). Post-Office — Threatening Postal Cards. — A postal card on which is a demand for a dt;bt and a statement that " if it is not paid at once, we shall place the same with our lawyer for collection," is non-mailable matter within 25 St. U. S. 496, prohibiting the mailing of an envelope, wrapper, or postal card on the outside of which is language of *' defamatory or threatening character, or cal- culated and obviously intended to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of another." But a postal card containing the words " Please call and settle account, which is long past due and for which our collector has called several times, and oblige," etc , is not within the statute, as the language is not threatening, or calculated to attract public notice. U. S. v. Baley, 40 Fed. Rep. 665. Real Property — Compensation for Obstructing Ancient Lights. — A warehouse, authorized by statute, darkened the lights, some ancient, some modern, of an abutter. Held, that apart from the words of the statute, the measure of damages should include the modern lights, since their darkening was a natural consequence of the obstruction of the ancient lights. /;/ re London, Tilbury, <Sr» Southend Railway Co. et al., 24 Q. B. Div. 326. Real Property — Possibility Upon a Possibility. — The testator left land in trust for his unmarried daughter for life, remainder to any husband whom she might marry, remainder in fee to their children. Held, that the legal remainders were void, since she might marry a man unborn at the testator's death. The rule against a possibility upon a possibility is an absolute rule, independent of the rule against perpetuities. In re Frost, 43 Ch. D. 246. This is the first case to follow the rule laid down in Whitby v. Mitchell, 42 Ch. D. 494. For a digest of this case and references to the authorities on this disputed point see 3 Harv. L. Rev. 284. Real Property — Quitclaim Deed. — The grantee under a quitclaim deed takes the estate subject to the equities. For when a person purchases of another who is willing to give only a quitclaim deed, the purchaser is bound to inquire at his peril what outstanding equities exist. He cannot be deemed a jjurchaser with- out notice. His grantor virtually declares to him that he will not warrant the title, and it may be presumed that the purchase price was fixed accordingly. Steele et al. v. Sioux Valley Bank, 44 N. W. Rep. 564 (la.). Statute of Frauds — Memorandum — Parol Evidence. — Where a memo- randum of a contract for the sale of land, which failed to identify the property, and a receipt " on account of the purchase-money for the Fleton Manor House estate," signed by the defendant, were connected by parol evidence, held, there was a good memorandum within the Statute of Frauds. Oliver v. Hunting, 62 L. T. Rep. N. s. 108 (Eng.). Statute of Limitations — Dividends — Demand Necessary. — An action was brought to recover dividends declared upon the stock of the defendant cor- poration. It appeared that these dividends had not been paid for many years,