Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/431

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HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
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Harvard Law Review. Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students. SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 PER ANNUM 35 CENTS PER NUMBER. Editorial Board. Jeremiah Smith, Jr., Editor-in-Chief. Charles Walcott, Treasurer. John A. Blanchard, Hugh W. Ogden, Justin D. Bowersock, James L. Putnam, Robert Cushman, Herbert A; Rice, David A. Ellis, Alex. D. Salinger, Louis A. Frothingham, Charles B, Sears, Albert K. Gerald, John S. Sheppard, Jr., Richard W. Hale, Frank B. Williams. Archibald C. Matteson, Swiff v. Tyson vs. Gelpcke v. Dubuque. — The Review is requested to add to the citations in Mr. Rand's article in the last number the fol- lowing authorities : Harris v. Gex, 55 New York, 421 ; and Forepaugh v. R. R. Co., 128 Pa. State, 217, which is contrary to the decision in Faulk' ner v. Hart, mentioned on page 2i'h2>' Proposed Changes in the Bribery Laws. — The Attorney-General of Massachusetts, in his report for the year ending January 16, 1895, strongly advises material changes in the present bribery laws (pp. 26-29). As long as a party to the offence may constitutionally refuse to testify, on the ground that it may tend to criminate him, it is of little use to establish machinery for the enforcement of any law against corrupt prac- tices in elections. Some effective way of securing such testimony must be adopted, it is urged, and the confinement of the criminality of the act to the person who pays the money is one of the means proposed. Whether this will work well in election cases or not, whether it would not be more expedient to punish the taker of the bribe rather than the giver, — are serious and important questions. In Kansas, where the method suggested was carried into effect in 1869, and given the widest scope, the results seem to have been far from gratifying. Indeed, there is now an agitation for the repeal of that law, and the substitution of another making only the bribe-taker punishable, on the ground that it is much more probable that one who has bribed a public officer might make that fact known, than that the public 'officer would proclaim his own disgrace. This reasoning, while certainly strong when the recipient is a public official, makes rather the other way when he, as candidate, is the giver. Since it is practically with this latter case alone, i. e. bribery at elections, that the Attorney-General is concerned, it would certainly seem that his suggestion was not open to the harsh criticisms which have 5S