550 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. vested immediately in the son and three fourths in the charity. Hamlin v. Mansfield, 11 Atl. Rep. 788 (Me.). It would seem that an equitable fee vested immediately in the charity in this case, subject to the provisions in regard to the partnership. If so, the rule against perpetu- ities could have no application, except under the erroneous doctrine of Slade v. Patten, 68 Me. 380, by which perhaps the court felt bound. The provisions for the firm, while not enforceable against the equitable owner, might well have been permitted at the dis- cretion of the trustee. The only remote gift is the one fourth to the son or his heirs, since it may not vest for two lives. This gift the court gives effect to, so that the case seems wrong on all points. Property — Tenant for Life and Remainderman — Payment of Charge ON Inheritance. — H. devised two houses, subject to a mortgage, to his wife C. for life, remainder to his children equally. C. expended a part of the rents in discharging the mortgage, and died. Her execiitor claims the amount so spent from the trustees of H.'s will, the houses having been sold under its provisions. Held, the fact that the re- lation of parent and child subsisted between C. and the remaindermen does not rebut the presumption that she intended to keep the charge alive for her own benefit. In re Harvey, [1896] I Ch. 137. The rule followed has grown up despite the fact that a large proportion of future estates created are, as matter of common knowledge, similar to the above, and the decision would seem correct. The rule may be traced through Jones v. Morgan, I Bro. C. C. 206, 218; St. Paul v. Lord Dudley, 15 Ves. 167; Biirrell v. Lord Egremont, 7 Beav. 205; and (dictum) Morley v, Morlev, 5 D. M. & G. 610, 626. Cer- tain expressions in the latter case may justify the defendants' contention. The present decision fails to state whether there was an assignment of the claim, losing sight of a distinction touched upon in the earlier cases. The passage quoted by A. L. Smith, L. J., would seem to indicate that there was not. As to estates tail, see /ones v. A/organ {supra), St. Paul v. Lord Dudley (supra), and I Story, Eq. Jur., 12th ed. c. 8, § 486. Property — Water — Spring — Ownership. — Defendant came on plaintiff's land and carried away water from plaintiff's spring. Held, plaintiff had such prop- ertv rights in the water as to entitle him to recover damages. Metcalfv. Nelson, 65 N. W: Rep. 911 (S. D). The point came up squarely, as the plaintiff sued for damages for the value of the water rather than to pursue his certain remedy of trespass. The few English authorities reach a contrary conclusion. They go on the ground that property in spring water is analogous to property in air and wild animals, and that title can be acquired only by occupancy; the owner of the reality having merely a usufructuaiy interest. The last English decision is that of Race v. Ward, 4 E. & B. 703 (1855). See also 2 Blackstone. 14, 18; Year Book, Trin. 15 Ed. IV. 29, case 7; Man/iing v. Wasdale, 5 A. & E. 758, The principal case seems to be the only one where the question has aiisen in the United States. The conclusion is a desirable one, and the case would doubtless be fol- lowed. Perhaps it can be reconciled with the English decisions, as it assumes that the spring was formed by percolating waters, while the English cases assume that a spring is the outlet of an underground channel. Both the English and American courts recog- nize a distinction between rights in percolating waters and those flowing in an under- ground channel. The authorities are collected in 64 Am. Dec. 727-730. Torts — Assault — Right of Action in Party Consenting to an Abor- tion.— -Defendant induced plaintiff to submit to an attempted abortion by a phy- sician procured by plaintiff. Plaintiff's health was thereby seriously injured, and she sued defendant for damages. Held, her consent to the act deprived her of a right to recover civil damages therefor. Goldnamer v. 0'B?'ien, 2,Z S. W. Rep. 831 (Ky.). It is doubtful whether in our law there are any general principles applicable to the right of a party to recover damages for the results of a criminal act to which he has consented. Consent to the destruction of property, under circumstances making the destruction criminal, would doubtless prevent a civil recovery by the owner. Consent to seduction is a bar to a civil suit by the party seduced. On the other hand, consent to the battery involved in a fist-fight is, by the great weight of authority, no defence to a civil action by either of the parties against the other. It is said the latter is a breach of the peace, something so abhorrent to the law that consent to it is void on public grounds. This is an excellent reason for severe criminal punishment, doubtless, but it is perhaps not quite clear how the public weal is benefited by allowing a willing party to a criminal act to recover for the consequences of his own law-breaking. If it be sound law, however, to allow a principal in a prize-fight to salve his injuries at his adversary's expense, public ])olicy would seem to demand even more strongly the same privilege for the victim of a criminal operation. The Kentucky court recognizes the
