of the United States; it would impair the obligations of contracts, and be in the nature of an ex post facto law; and the constitution of the United States is paramount, and her laws of superior force to the action of the state convention, as well as of legislatures.
We refer the court to the following authorities, as to laws impairing the obligation of contracts: 2 Story on Const., p. 236, sec. 1385; Blair vs. Williams, 4 Littell, Ky., 38-47; Lapsley vs. Brashear, ib. 56; ib. 75, 76; Davis vs. Ballard, 1 J. J. Marshall, (Ky.) 570; Tounsend vs. Tounsend, 1 Peck. Tenn., 1; Record Book K., of Opinions Sup. Ct. Ark., Burt vs. Williams—Opinion per Fairchild, (J.) p. 506; Smith's Com. on Constitutional Law, p. 384, sec. 252.
As to ex post facto laws, vide, Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, (1 Cond. Rep. 308;) Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dallas 386; (1 Cond. Rep. 172.
And on both the latter points, see Society vs. Wheeler, 2 Gallison 105.
RICE, for the defendant.
There was no judgment rendered in any court of the United States as a foundation for the execution.
The court will take judicial notice of the fact that there was a revolution on the part of the people of the state against the government of the United States, that the courts held in Arkansas when this judgment was rendered, were rendered under confederate, and not federal authority; that every department of the state, executive, legislative and judicial claimed allegiance to the confederate government; that the revolution, was unsuccessful; and that no civil government was established, that was recognized by any foreign power, or by the United States. The recognizing the "rebels" as belligerents bv the United States was not recognizing them as a civil government. See Secretary Seward's letter to Mr. Adams.
If the confederate government was a civil government, it was
