Opinion of the Court
III
The FNHRA can create §1983-enforceable rights. But do the two FNHRA provisions at issue in this case actually do so? In that respect, our precedent sets a demanding bar: Statutory provisions must unambiguously confer individual federal rights. Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 280. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the bar has been cleared with respect to the presently contested provisions. And while the FNHRA itself might nevertheless evince Congress’s intent to preclude the use of §1983 to enforce these particular rights, id., at 284, n. 4, we hold further that it does not.
A
The FNHRA provisions at issue in this case, like the rest of the Act, stem from a longstanding national commitment to provide safe and dignified care for the elderly. Since as early as the Social Security Act of 1935, federal law has aimed in myriad ways to promote nursing homes that provide quality services. Yet, concerns about the poor condition of such facilities persisted even after Congress enacted the 1965 Medicare and Medicaid Acts,[1] partly due to widespread noncompliance with existing federal and state laws. See Institute of Medicine, Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes 2–3, 11, 241–246 (1986); H. R. Rep. No. 100–391, pt. 1, pp. 448–452 (1987). Thus, in 1987, Congress passed, and President Ronald Reagan signed, the FNHRA, effecting a “seismic shift” in nursing-home quality standards. B. Furrow, T. Greaney, S. Johnson, T. Jost, & R. Schwartz, Health Law 51 (3d ed. 2015) (Health Law).[2] The
- ↑ Medicare “provides Government-funded health insurance to” millions of “elderly or disabled Americans,” while Medicaid “provides health insurance to all low-income individuals, regardless of age or disability.” Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center, 597 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 2–3).
- ↑ The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 added the FNHRA
