Opinion of the Court
boldface deleted); see also West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 16) (statutory provisions “ ‘must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme’ ”). This framing is indicative of an individual “rights-creating” focus. Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 284. Examined further, the text of the unnecessary-restraint and predischarge-notice provisions unambiguously confers rights upon the residents of nursing-home facilities.
The unnecessary-restraint provision requires nursing homes to “protect and promote … [t]he right to be free from … any physical or chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience and not required to treat the resident’s medical symptoms.” §1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The provision’s enumerated exceptions further sustain the focus on individual residents. For example, nursing homes may use restraints “to ensure the physical safety of the resident or other residents,” but “only upon the written order of a physician that specifies the duration and circumstances under which the restraints are to be used” (absent emergency circumstances specified by the HHS Secretary). §§1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I)–(II) (emphasis added).
The predischarge-notice provision is more of the same. Nestled in a paragraph concerning “transfer and discharge rights,” §1396r(c)(2) (emphasis added; boldface deleted), that provision tells nursing facilities that they “must not transfer or discharge [a] resident” unless certain preconditions are met, including advance notice of the transfer or discharge to the resident and his or her family. §§1396r(c)(2)(A)–(B) (emphasis added). And, again, the statute’s caveats remain focused on individual residents: A nursing home may transfer or discharge such an individual if, among other things, the transfer is “necessary to meet the resident’s welfare”; or if the resident’s health has improved so much that the facility is no longer necessary; or if
