Opinion of the Court
(statutory “remedial devices” that are “sufficiently comprehensive … may suffice” to show implicit preclusion). But when a particular comprehensive remedial scheme discharges the defendant’s burden, it does so because the application of ordinary interpretive tools reveals incompatibility, i.e., it demonstrates that “Congress intended [that] statute’s remedial scheme to be the ‘exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert [his] claims.’ ” Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 252.
Nothing in the FNHRA indicates the incompatibility evinced in our three prior cases finding implicit preclusion. Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120–123, 127; Smith, 468 U. S., at 1008–1013; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 6–7, 19–21. Rancho Palos Verdes, Smith, and Sea Clammers concerned statutes with self-contained enforcement schemes that included statute-specific rights of action. Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120–123; Smith, 468 U. S., at 1008–1012; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 6–7, 17, and n. 27, 19–21. Each such statute required plaintiffs to “comply with particular procedures and/or to exhaust particular administrative remedies” under the statute’s enforcement scheme before suing under its dedicated right of action. Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 254. And each statute-specific right of action offered fewer benefits than those available under §1983. Ibid., and n. 1. Thus, in all three cases, §1983’s operation would have thwarted Congress’s scheme coming and going: It would have “circumvented” the statutes’ presuit procedures, and would have also “given plaintiffs access to tangible benefits” as remedies that were “unavailable under the statutes.” Id., at 254. Those “ ‘comprehensive enforcement scheme[s]’ ” were “ ‘incompatible with individual enforcement under §1983.’ ” Id., at 252 (quoting Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120).
HHC has identified no equivalent sign in the FNHRA; nor has Justice Alito, see post, at 1, 3–5 (dissenting opinion). In focusing on what the FNHRA contains, they ignore
