Opinion of the Court
much less a license for us to construct and impute congressional intent that the FNHRA does not embody.
The difficulty for HHC and the United States is that implicit preclusion, in this context, requires something in the statute that shows that permitting §1983 to operate would “thwar[t] Congress’ intent” in crafting the FNHRA. Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 253. We see nothing in the FNHRA that even hints at Congress’s intent in this regard; if anything, the language of the Act confirms otherwise, for it plainly states that “[t]he remedies provided under” its enforcement-process subsection are “in addition to those otherwise available under State or Federal law and shall not be construed as limiting such other remedies.” §1396r(h)(8) (emphasis added).[1] We will not rewrite §1396r(h)(8) in lieu of rewriting §1983.[2] ***
At oral argument, HHC’s counsel remarked that the “right question” is “what rights are secured by law within
- ↑ We found similar (but not identical) language to be insufficient to preserve the presumption in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981), and Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113 (2005). See id., at 125–127. But those clauses did not purport to preserve “other remedies,” and were embedded in statutes that (unlike the FNHRA) contained private judicial rights of action. See ibid.; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 6–7, 20, and n. 31. The FNHRA’s explicitly expressed objective of preserving other remedies bolsters our reluctance to infer implicit displacement of the §1983 remedy. We think Justice Alito’s response in this regard overreads Rancho Palos Verdes. See post, at 6. That case merely provided an unremarkable description of Sea Clammers’ “refus[al] to read” the saving clauses there as preserving §1983 actions, in light of the different (and significant) textual and contextual evidence of preclusion that the statutes at issue provided. Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 127.
- ↑ The United States’ suggestion that §1396r(h)(8) just ensures that remedies available under non-FNHRA, non-§1983 statutes remain available is not persuasive. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 34. Nothing in the Act supports interpreting §1396r(h)(8)’s language in that manner, especially given §1983’s unqualified command.
