Barrett, J., concurring
sive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under §1983.’ ” Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 284–285, n. 4.
As the Court notes, the presence of an “express private judicial right of action” typically demonstrates that a §1983 suit is not also available. Ante, at 19; see Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 121 (2005) (express cause of action “is ordinarily an indication that Congress did not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under §1983”). When the statutory cause of action restricts available remedies or imposes procedural hurdles to obtaining relief, the inference is even stronger. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Comm., 555 U. S. 246, 254 (2009) (considering whether a §1983 suit “would have circumvented these procedures and given plaintiffs access to tangible benefits—such as damages, attorney’s fees, and costs—that were unavailable under the statut[e]”); Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 122–123 (similar).
But an actual clash—one private judicial remedy against another, more expansive remedy—is not required to find that a statute forecloses recourse to §1983. Our cases have looked to a wide range of contextual clues, like “enforcement provisions” that “confe[r] authority to sue … on government officials,” Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 13, 20, and any “administrative remedies” that the statute offers, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1012 (1984). We have noted the relevance of a centralized review mechanism that would be undermined by piecemeal litigation. Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 289–290 (statute directed the Secretary of Education to establish a review board to investigate and adjudicate alleged violations). And we have regularly taken account of the overall comprehensiveness of the statute’s enforcement scheme. The more comprehensive the scheme, the less likely that it leaves the door open for §1983 suits. Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 20 (“When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive,
