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HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION CTY. v. TALEVSKI

Thomas, J., dissenting

It carries with it “no incidental power, nor does it draw after it any consequences of that kind.” Id., at 168. Monroe proceeded to carefully distinguish the spending power from Congress’ authority to impose obligations and duties: “[T]he use or application of the money after it is raised is a power altogether of a different character” from Congress’ enumerated regulatory powers such as the taxing power; “[i]t imposes no burden on the people, nor can it act on them in a sense to take power from the States.” Id., at 164.

Applying this understanding of the spending power to the question of internal improvements, Monroe explained that Congress could only “appropriate the money necessary to make them.” Id., at 168. Where none of Congress’ enumerated regulatory powers was applicable, Monroe concluded, “[f]or every act requiring legislative sanction or support the State authority must be relied on.” Ibid. Thus, Congress could not itself pass laws providing for “[t]he condemnation of the land, … the establishment of turnpikes and tolls, and the protection of the work when finished.” Ibid.

Monroe’s summation of the federal spending power, reflecting that it does not carry with it any regulatory power, was accepted throughout the 19th century by friends and foes of federal power alike. In his 1825 inaugural address, President John Quincy Adams explained that Monroe’s Views had “conciliated the sentiments and approximated the opinions of enlightened minds upon the question of constitutional power.” Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1825, in 5 American State Papers, Foreign Relations 753, 755 (1858). Five years later, President Andrew Jackson vetoed the Maysville Road Bill of 1830 for the same reasons Monroe had vetoed the Cumberland Road Bill of 1822: Congress lacks “[t]he right to exercise as much jurisdiction as is necessary to preserve the works and to raise funds by the collection of tolls to keep them in repair,” and “[w]ithout [such power] nothing extensively useful can be effected.” Richardson 492.