Thomas, J., dissenting
a manner thought beneficial by Congress, there is no direct exercise of Federal power on those affairs and they remain subject to the unhampered control of the States. Consequently, in a case of this nature, the effect which the Act of Congress will have in a State is dependent entirely upon the voluntary action of that State and its inhabitants.” Id., at 274, 276.
In deciding the case, the Court took the Government’s concessions as given, stating, “[i]t is not contended that [the General Welfare Clause] grants power to regulate agricultural production.” Butler, 297 U. S., at 64. The Court then agreed with Justice Story’s observation that “the only thing granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation’s debts and making provision for the general welfare.” Ibid. Congress’ spending power, even if located in the General Welfare Clause, conferred no regulatory power.
The Court proceeded to hold the Act unconstitutional precisely because it was, in reality, “a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government.” Id., at 68. That was because the “regulation [was] not in fact voluntary,” as it would lead to “financial ruin” for farmers who refused the Act’s benefits. Id., at 70–71. Confirming another aspect of the traditional doctrine, the Court held that even the purely voluntary consent of private parties could not expand Congress’ limited regulatory powers. Id., at 74–75.[1]
- ↑ The anticoercion rule reflected in Butler remains a vital part of this Court’s spending-power jurisprudence. See NFIB, 567 U. S., at 575–585 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.); id., at 671–678 (joint dissent of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.). As Butler makes clear, that rule is firmly rooted in the contractual understanding of spending conditions, and NFIB further recognized the close connection between the rule and the anticommandeering doctrine when spending conditions involving States are at issue. See NFIB, 567 U. S., at 575–585 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.);
