Thomas, J., dissenting
source in one of Congress’ enumerated powers or the legislative powers of the States. Congress’ spending power cannot secure rights by law.
IV
The contractual nature of spending conditions was taken as a given until the second half of the 20th century, when individuals first began to bring §1983 suits premised on violations of conditions contained within spending statutes (usually, the Social Security Act). From the enactment of §1983’s predecessor statute in 1871 to the Court’s decision in Thiboutot in 1980, this Court had never held that §1983 was available to redress any and all violations of federal legislation. Indeed, there were almost “no square holdings” concerning the precise scope of the statutory rights vindicable by §1983. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 645 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560, 561–566 (CA2 1969) (Friendly, J.). Perhaps the only such square holding was that of Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U. S. 68 (1900), which narrowly construed §1983’s predecessor statute to “refer to civil rights only,” making it “inapplicable” in a suit based on the federal patent laws. Id., at 72.[1]
- ↑ This civil rights connection was not arbitrary. Section 1983 originated in the Enforcement Act of 1871, which Congress “passed for the express purpose of ‘enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.’ ” Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 25, n. 15 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting 17 Stat. 13; alteration in original). Moreover, the original text of the statute referred only to rights “secured by the Constitution of the United States,” 17 Stat. 13, the words “and laws” being added as part of the general 1874 revision of the federal statutes. Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. Under the circumstances, there is substantial reason to doubt that Congress fundamentally transformed a mechanism to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments into a freestanding right of action to remediate the violation of any federal statute, even those enacted beyond Congress’ civil rights enforcement powers. Importantly, if statutory §1983 actions were confined to laws enacted under Congress’ Reconstruction Amendments enforcement powers—under which Congress may directly
