Opinion of the Court
tion enables courts to block frivolous attempts to transfer disputes from the court system to arbitration.
We conclude that the “wholly groundless” exception is inconsistent with the text of the Act and with our precedent.
We must interpret the Act as written, and the Act in turn requires that we interpret the contract as written. When the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract. In those circumstances, a court possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue. That is true even if the court thinks that the argument that the arbitration agreement applies to a particular dispute is wholly groundless.
That conclusion follows not only from the text of the Act but also from precedent. We have held that a court may not “rule on the potential merits of the underlying” claim that is assigned by contract to an arbitrator, “even if it appears to the court to be frivolous.” AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649–650 (1986). A court has “ ‘no business weighing the merits of the grievance’ ” because the “ ‘agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious.’ ” Id., at 650 (quoting Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564, 568 (1960)).
That AT&T Technologies principle applies with equal force to the threshold issue of arbitrability. Just as a court may not decide a merits question that the parties have delegated to an arbitrator, a court may not decide an arbitrability question that the parties have delegated to an arbitrator.
In an attempt to overcome the statutory text and this Court’s cases, Archer and White advances four main arguments. None is persuasive.
First, Archer and White points to §§3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act. Section 3 provides that a court must
