any serious danger. The Vladivostok cruisers now and again had a slight and very temporary effect on communications: but generally speaking it was found that the 'fleet in being' of Russia was a negligible quantity. But the lessons to be drawn from this are rendered doubtful by the fact that Russia in the Crimean war pursued identical tactics in the matter of not using her fleet to attack an oversea invasion. We know then, that this was a matter of definite policy. How far a similar policy was in force in the war under review we cannot yet ascertain. Till it is known, we cannot assign a cipher to the 'fleet in being' remedy against invasion, on the grounds that the Russian fleet to all intents and purposes was innocuous to the invading army of Japan.
Perhaps one of the most prominent features of the war, certainly the most novel was the large use made of floating mines. These were used promiscuously by both sides: indeed most of the so-called Russian floating mines destroyed in the Gulf of Pechili were Japanese.
Strictly speaking the laying of mines outside the three-mile limit is illegal; but in these days the three-mile limit is obsolete and illogical. If mines have any object at all, that object is the prevention of bombardments. Bombarding range is, however, at least anything up to five miles or so, hence the absurdity of expecting any belligerent to observe strictly a rule which would render his mines half useless. From
