Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/126

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102
HERESIES OF SEA POWER

utilised the 'new arm' to the best advantage, and — the nationality of those mines which were effective being in doubt—it cannot be shown that either side gained to any great extent by their use. It is quite possible that if the Japanese had used no mines at all they would have been a ship or two better off. The uncertainty of mines was also demonstrated. Undoubtedly many broke adrift by accident or stress of weather: there are also cases in which ships passed uninjured over mine fields.[1]

The torpedo hardly came up to expectation in this war. Except in the doubtful cases of the Mikasa all torpedo attacks on ships in motion were failures till the last battle, and in that only ships already disabled by gun fire seem to have suffered.

The limited radius of torpedo craft was heavily felt by both sides. Thus, the Russian boats were never able to go far enough to encounter the Japanese fleet. Japanese boats were remarkably ubiquitous, but for four days work they had to have eight days rest, during which time their defects and injuries were made good. Repairs were effected at a phenomenal rate,[2] and, whatever is to be said upon the limits of torpedo craft utility or the success of Japanese torpedo attack, there is no

  1. Mikasa, Shikishima, and Asahi got on to a mine field just after the loss of the Hatsuse and Yashima. The flagship hit a mine which failed to explode, the Shikishima avoided it, finally one hit the Asahi and exploded but did no harm, as it was floating.
  2. One destroyer was entirely rebuilt from amidships within, it is said, three weeks.