scouts were peculiarly imaginative—a quality for which the Baltic Fleet was generally distinguished. In any case it appears that the Baltic Fleet when it entered the straits of Tsushima believed the bulk of the Japanese navy to be behind it, and the way to Vladivostok barred only by a certain number of torpedo craft and cruisers, through which in the fog it had a fair chance of passing unobserved. Rogestvensky's formation in two battle lines was a sound enough one in view of attacks from small craft only: it was so hopelessly bad against a battle-fleet attack that it is almost in itself evidence that he never expected to meet Togo when he did. Meeting him thus it is probable that a considerably better fleet would have been annihilated with equal ease.
It is said by the Russians, probably truly, that the sudden discovery that they were faced with a fleet action overwhelmed them completely. Whether this be so or not, it speaks much for the Russians that they were able during the night that followed to act in unison sufficiently to beat off two of the torpedo attacks: the wonder is that they held together so long, not that they scattered so soon. Once scattered, of course their destruction was very simple. Even at the end only four ships, the division of which Admiral Nebogatoff was in command, were sufficiently demoralised to surrender.
Of Admiral Nebogatoff's surrender two views may be taken. There is first of all the humanitarian view
