Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/132

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108
HERESIES OF SEA POWER

left alive after the surrender of Wei-hai-wei in the Chino-Japanese war: an action of great barbarity but—making due allowance for peculiar Chinese ideas and customs—not altogether to be blamed. Or we may go back to the Carthaginians and their cruel but probably useful practice of crucifying the defeated leader. It did not insure victory; but it was certainly a safeguard against defeat wherever victory was possible. So were the Chinese and Russian regulations on the matter.

The Russian ones were very clear: that in the event of defeat a captain was to destroy his ship. This was done by the captains of the Varaig and Korietz: it was done (not very thoroughly) when General Stoessel surrendered Port Arthur: it was done by most of the captains of the ill-starred Baltic Fleet, and ought to have been done by Admiral Nebogatoff,[1] so that his omission to do so indicates better than any list of sunken ships the completeness of the Tsushima victory.

  1. It may, however, be noted that the final reason given by Admiral Nebogatoff in his article in the 1906 Fighting Ships gives a justification outside the naval standpoint.