six, but no study of history will teach how it is to be done except by being doubly fitter to win. Once there were days when by passing under the sterns of the enemy the three might have a very good chance, supposing the manoeuvre to succeed—to-day such a manoeuvre would almost certainly lead to the three being torpedoed. Once, as at Lissa, where the weaker Austrian fleet rushed the stronger Italians, victory was won by daring valour—to-day the torpedo would probably intervene long before the terror of the ram could create any confusion. Cutting the line in the past accomplished much—to-day the torpedo again intervenes.
Yet, to-day, if the three can 'cross the T' by passing across the bows of the six they may do a great deal and destroy in detail. It is possible;, but possible only to very efficient ships and to a leader of remarkable skill. It is harder than it was, and as years go on is likely to become harder still.
This indeed is the tendency of all tactics, though probably cycles obtain. Take, for instance, the case of a fleet lying in battle order in a bay—a situation which has obtained off and on continually throughout history. In ancient times it was a very favourite formation to adopt. The Greeks were so disposed at Salamis, and emerged the winners. In the Peloponnesian war the Peloponnesian fleet took up a very similar position behind the island of Sphakteria; but the Athenians
