entire action fired only at one and the same vessel in the opposing fleet— that is to say, done pretty much what the Russians did at Round Island.
Here, then, we have two distinct results of the application of the doctrine of concentration of effort. Suffren by employing it secured, despite an indecisive action, moral and material results equal almost to a victory, since for over a month he had two units less to contend against. This incident of Suffren's concentration, figuring as it does very largely in the pages of Captain Mahan's 'Influence of Sea Power upon History,' was undoubtedly known to the Russian admiral Witgeft and to the Japanese admiral Togo. Both, no doubt, fully recognised how advantageous it had proved to Suffren, and evidently ordered a similar thing. As a result, the Mikasa was very considerably knocked about, sustaining, in addition to other bad hits which reduced her gun fire, a water line penetration which might well have served as an excuse for her leaving the line, though as a matter of fact she did not do so. As for the rest of the Japanese fleet, it might for all the harm it sustained from the Russians, never have been in action at all.[1]
The Japanese fire was directed almost solely at the Tsarevitch till that vessel left the line; thereafter, with the exception of a concentration upon the
- ↑ It is true that some of them had big guns out of action, but this was due to premature explosion of their H.E. shell, not to the Russian fire.
