be sufficiently unfriendly, or they might see sufficient gain to themselves in the destruction of British commerce to waive their more immediate interests. This is at least a possibility. So, too, is a combination, and always the real guerre de course is the danger to be guarded against—that is to say a war against commerce supplemented by occasional action or attempted action of battleships.
It has, further, to be borne in mind that the platitude 'Commerce destruction cannot win a war,' is useless, when no British victory can atone for the loss of the world's carrying trade which, once lost, is hardly likely to be regained. Hence, therefore, commerce must not only be protected from destruction: it must also be so defended that it can be carried on with comparative impunity.
There are two ways by which this end may be sought—the first by a vigorous offensive on the hostile fleet and a blockade so severe that very few commerce destroyers or cruisers can get out and fewer still return. The objective, however, would not be the commerce destroyers but the enemy's fleet in general, by the destruction of which a still more vigorous blockade would be assured and the number of possible corsairs very materially lessened. If necessary, even commerce should be sacrificed for the single end of destroying the enemy's fleet. Combined with this system a few powerful cruisers, easily able to destroy any corsair met with, would perhaps be stationed off
