'profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues' in the matter for them, since they lost their fleets fighting in the harbour with Syracusans who, lacking aptitude for grand sea fights, extemporised barge-like warships filled with heavy-armed soldiery and turned the sea into land for the occasion. They had neither command of the sea nor Sea Power, but they were completely victorious.
Should one use this as an argument that Sea Power, as generally understood, is useless? Hardly : but it is a fair inference that well-trained seamen and ships are not alone factors of determining importance, unless the conditions are otherwise suitable. At Syracuse they were not suitable; but that does not affect the deduction, of which this is a most remarkable instance, that Sea Power is an illusive thing and not a universal weapon. It is only of service in the hands of the better man, and without it he will probably find some other means to win.
In a fight in the open sea Athenian skill would have annihilated the Syracusan barge fleet, but the Syracusans did not give the opportunity. They waited to be attacked by Sea Power under their own conditions, conditions which neutralised the value of Sea Power, and made it of no account. They used their barge ships, it is true; they used them to crash into the light Athenian vessels in that constricted harbour of Syracuse, where seaman-ship availed nothing : their men were 'soldiers at
