ALITO, J., dissenting
are unavailing.
Herrera contends that he is not bound by the Repsis judgment because he was not a party, but this argument is clearly wrong. Indian hunting rights, like most Indian treaty rights, are reserved to the Tribe as a whole. Herrera’s entitlement derives solely from his membership in the Tribe; it is not personal to him. As a result, a judgment determining the rights of the Tribe has preclusive effect in subsequent litigation involving an individual member of the Tribe. Cf. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 106–108 (1938) (judgment as to water rights of a State is binding on individual residents of State). That rule applies equally to binding judgments finding in favor of and against asserted tribal rights.
Herrera also argues that a judgment in a civil action should not have preclusive effect in a subsequent criminal prosecution, but this argument would unjustifiably prevent the use of the declaratory judgment device to determine potential criminal exposure. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides an equitable remedy allowing a party to ask a federal court to “declare [the party’s] rights” through an order with “the force and effect of a final judgment.” 28 U. S. C. §2201(a). The Act thus allows a person to obtain a definitive ex ante determination of his or her right to engage in conduct that might otherwise be criminally punishable. It thereby avoids “putting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or risking prosecution.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 129 (2007). If the Tribe had prevailed in Repsis, surely Herrera would expect that Wyoming could not attempt to relitigate the question in this case and in prosecutions of other members of the Tribe. A declaratory judgment “is conclusive . . . as to the matters declared” when the State prevails just as it would be when the party challenging the State is the winning party. Restatement
