of over 84 millions, of which rather more than £585,350 was in cash, and £1,823,926 was in investments in British Funds, Colonial and Foreign stocks and bonds, railway preference stocks and sundry debentures and shares "at or below current quotations or valuations." The other six millions were made up of bills receivable, debtors on trade account, stocks of material, stores and movable plant, freehold and leasehold premises and fixed plant, licensed properties, trade loans, goodwill and trade marks.
We found that the figures set against all these items depend to a great extent on the opinion held by the Board and the managers concerning the value that should be set upon them for balance-sheet purposes, and that this was an inevitable feature in the great majority of industrial balance-sheets. We also saw reason to believe that most Boards and managers would err on the side of undervaluing rather than overstating these necessarily doubtful assets.
In the case of the banks, the proportion of doubtful assets is much smaller. There is no doubt about the cash and practically none about the loans at call and short notice, which are lent to first-class firms on first-class security. The bills of exchange are also for
