concern domestic politics or international politics. There must somehow be a standard which is capable of universal application. We cannot only praise a man for accomplishing something of which we approve, unless we can also approve of the way in which he has done it. This is hard doctrine, and threatens to make short work of heroes altogether. We shrink from applying strict moral judgments to great men or to great events, because we feel, somehow or other, that size and scale introduce a real difference. It is rather difficult to justify this impression, which is indeed somewhat rudimentary.
There is a difference between public and private morality; but I do not know that any analysis has yet succeeded in determining what that difference is. It is clear that the difference does not lie in the moral principles which regulate human conduct, but in the difficulty of applying them, with sufficient accuracy, in a sphere where ordinary guides and secondary motives do not exist. In our own affairs, moral principles are enforced by known sanctions, and are embodied in the opinion which surrounds us. It is easier to be moral when the result of our actions is apparent; it becomes more difficult when the consequences are removed from view. The ordinary man has a higher moral standard in his relations towards his family and household than he has to those whom he employs in his factory or workshop. He exercises more care in forming a wise opinion about the conduct of his own business than he does about the business of the State. If I extend this obvious principle to the consideration of the dangers which beset great
