1584-] EXPULSION OF MENDOZA. 421 lands. But if he had sent the handful of men which Guise had asked for, the Catholics, he said, who were now in prison, would all have been in their graves. 1 His fears about the Netherlands seemed likely to be realized. St Aldegonde, in reply to the message sent by Walsingham in November, had answered that the States were at the last extremity. They could not hold out beyond the following summer without help, and if England continued to keep aloof, there were but two alternatives before them. If the whole of the States, including Holland and Zealand, would consent to be annexed to France, the French, notwithstanding the accident at Antwerp, were still ready to risk a war for the acquisition ; otherwise necessity was a law of iron, and they must submit to Spain. 2 It was hard to say which of these two results would be most unwelcome in England. It was a received political axiom that the acquisition of the Provinces by France would be fatal to English independence, while for Spain to recover the seaboard of Zealand, with a war impending, was equally formidable. The States, St Aldegonde said, were ready to contribute 60,000 crowns a month if England would add 30,000. Fifteen thousand men could then be kept in the field, or maintained in garrison, and would suffice to hold Parma at bay for ever. 3 The sum was not large in itself, but the ex- 1 Philip to Olivarez, January 31 February 10, 1584: MSS. Si- mancas. 2 St Aldegonde to "Walsingham, December, 1583 : MSS. Holland. 3 Roger Williams to Walsingham, January 26 February 5 : MSS. Holland.
