only enter in experienced hands; and they had found the approaches so full of shoals and hidden sand-bars, that, for a fleet to advance in the face of an enemy was, as the pilots said, an impossibility.
It remained, therefore, to decide whether the army should land in force upon the island, and drive the English out of it, as they might easily do. They had brought with them seven thousand pioneers, who could throw up fortresses rapidly at Newport, Cowes, St Helen's, and elsewhere; and they could leave garrisons strong enough to maintain their ground against any force which the English would be able to bring against them. They would thus hold in their hands a security for Boulogne; and as the English did not dare to face their fleet in the open water, they might convert their tenure into a permanence.
This was the course which they were intended to pursue; and it was the course which, in the opinion of Du Bellay, one of the ablest generals in France, they indisputably ought to have pursued. In neglecting it he considered that an opportunity was wasted, the loss of which his confidence in Providence and in the destinies of France alone enabled him to forgive.
D'Annebault, however, had received discretionary powers; and, for some unknown reason, he determined to try his fortune elsewhere. After three days of barren demonstration, the fleet weighed anchor and sailed. His misfortunes in the Isle of Wight were not yet over. The ships were in want of fresh water; and on leaving St Helen's he went round into Shanklin
