Italians, Walloons, Hollanders, and Lanzknechts, who would be ranged under the Imperial banners.[1]
The Emperor's arguments might be good; but they did not prove his conclusions. It might be necessary for him to retain his army under his own control, yet he need not carry it with him to Paris. Charles, however, from some cause, was unwilling to listen. Wisely or unwisely, he was bent on the original design; and, unable to convince Paget, he sent back with him a confidential minister, M. de Courières, to England, if possible to satisfy the King.
Henry was bound by his engagement, and if the Emperor insisted on the observance of it, he must waive his own suggestions, as far as he could safely do so. It was more than ever obvious to him, however, that to march precipitately upon the French capital, leaving fortified towns in his rear to intercept his supplies, was a step which military prudence forbade. A large garrison had been thrown into Boulogne during the winter; an intrenched camp had been formed at Mottreul; and similar precautions had been taken along the frontiers of Burgundy. De Courières could not persuade him of the desirableness of leaving bodies of the enemy to close the communications in the rear of the armies. He would rather entreat the Emperor (and this was his last message) 'to weigh deeply his going to Paris, and to foresee what a great dishonour it should be for him to pass thither, and, constrained either by the power of
- ↑ Paget to Henry VIII.: State Papers, vol. ix. p. 682, &c.
