Page:History of Greece Vol V.djvu/374

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350 HISTOEY OF GREECE. But the recoriquest of Euboea was far from restoring Athene to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engage- ment of Koroneia. Her land empire was irretrievably gone, to- gether with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle ; and she reverted to her former condition of an exclu- sively maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisaea and Pegs, yet her communication with the latter harbor was now cut oflP by the loss of Megara and its appertain- in «• territory, so that she thus lost her means of acting in the Corinthian gulf, and of protecting as well as of constraining her aUies in Achaia. Nor was the port of Niseea of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city. Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects, — attempts which would now be seconded by Pelopon- nesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy car- rying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Perikles, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, fourteen years afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difliculty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion, — even in defence of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Perikles would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed pos- sessions or aUiances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace ; but we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency could have induced the Athe- nian assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglori- ous peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was con- cluded with Sparta and her aUies, in the beginning of 445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisaea, Pegs, Achaia, and Troezen,